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In this paper, we consider  an extension of the commonly used poverty gap 
measure that may be used to address he question of whether the elimination of 
poverty is a feasible objective, given sufficient political commitment. The 
resources potentially available to address poverty may be measured by the total 
amount by which the incomes of the non-poor exceed the same poverty line. The 
ratio of the poverty gap to the resources potentially available is equal to the 
proportional tax rate on incomes in excess of the poverty line that would  be 
required to fund a transfer sufficient to raise the incomes of all poor people to the 
poverty line. We refer to this ratio as the ‘poverty burden’ (PB). We provide a 
formal definition of the poverty burden and an analysis of its properties as a 
poverty measure. 
 
Keywords: Index numbers, Poverty, Aid 
JEL Codes: C43, I32, F35 
 
 1 
The Poverty Burden: A Measure of the Difficulty of Ending 
Extreme Poverty 
1. Introduction 
For perhaps the first time in the history of the world, the majority of people alive 
today are not poor, or, at least not extremely poor. The World Bank (2008) 
estimates that 2.5 billion people live on incomes of less than $US2/day (in 
PPP-adjusted 1990 values), of whom nearly 1 billion live on less than $1/day. By 
contrast, nearly 4 billion people have incomes above the $US2/day poverty line. 
Of these, around 1 billion people are very rich, at least by historical standards, 
with incomes greater than $10 000 a year, or around $300 a day. 
Relatively modest transfers from the well-off to the poor could, in the absence of 
leakages or offsetting negative effects, raise everyone in the world above the 
$1/day or $US2/day poverty lines. Thus, it is possible to propose the end of 
extreme poverty as a policy objective for the world community (Sachs 2005). The 
task has been made more difficult by the global financial crisis that began in 
2008, but remains urgent. 
The suggestion of eliminating poverty raises new issues of measurement. 
Although a wide range of poverty measures has been proposed, none seems 
well-suited to the question of whether the elimination of poverty is a feasible 
objective, given sufficient political commitment. 
In this paper, we consider an extension of the commonly used poverty gap 
measure that may be used to address this question. The poverty gap is equal to 
the total amount by which the incomes of the poor fall short of a given poverty 
line. Conversely, the resources potentially available to address poverty may be 
measured by the total amount by which the incomes of the non-poor exceed the 
same poverty line. The ratio of the poverty gap to the resources potentially 
available is equal to the proportional tax rate on incomes in excess of the poverty 
line that would be required to fund a transfer sufficient to raise the incomes of 2 
all poor people to the poverty line. We refer to this ratio as the ‘poverty burden’ 
(PB).  
Measures of this kind are not entirely new. Anand (1977, p. 7) notes 
parenthetically, and without citation, that ‘In the United States, the poverty gap 
is sometimes expressed as a fraction of GNP’, and estimates the poverty gap for 
Malaysia at 7.3 per cent of total income, or 8.3 per cent of the income of the 
non-poor.  Beckerman (1979) computes the poverty gap for the United Kingdom 
as a percentage of GDP and notes (p. 269) that ‘the post-benefit gap is only 0.25% 
of G.D.P.’ However, these measures have not been widely used, and there 
appears to have been little or no study of their formal properties. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the properties of the poverty burden, and 
to consider its usefulness in informing the debate over policies to reduce or 
eliminate extreme poverty. The paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 contains background material on measures of poverty and the way in 
which they have been used. Section 3 provides a formal definition of the poverty 
burden and an analysis of its properties as a poverty measure. Evidence on the 
way in which the poverty-income ratio has changed over time, for the world as a 
whole and for various regions is presented in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the 
relationship between the poverty burden measure and the policy debate over the 
effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty. It is argued that this debate has been 
distorted by an excessive focus on aid as an investment aimed at increasing rates 
of economic growth. Finally some concluding comments are offered in Section 6. 
2. Background 
A wide variety of poverty measures have been considered (Foster 1984, 1988; 
Kakwani 1980; Ravallion 1996; Sen 1976; Shorrocks 1987, 1995; Vaughan 1987). 
Most measures are computed with reference to a poverty line, which may be 
determined either exogenously, on the basis of some estimate of the expenditure 
required to avoid poverty, or endogenously, as a proportion of some measure of 
mean or median income. This difference in the choice of poverty line corresponds 3 
to the distinction between absolute and relative measures of poverty (Foster 
1998; Zheng 1994). 
Prominent examples of poverty measures include the head count measure (the 
number of people, or proportion of the population, falling below the poverty line), 
the poverty gap (the aggregate amount by which incomes of the poor fall below 
the poverty line) and the Sen normalized poverty value (Sen 1976). 
Broadly speaking, these measures are inequality measures that are sensitive 
only to the incomes of the poor. Changes in incomes for the non-poor affect these 
measures only to the extent that they may change the value of the poverty line, 
or to the extent that previously non-poor people become poor.  
If the poverty line is determined exogenously, an increase in the income of a 
non-poor person has no effect on measured poverty. If the poverty line is 
(weakly) monotonically increasing in the income vector (for example, if it is some 
fraction of mean or median income) then an increase in the income of a non-poor 
person (weakly) increases the value of poverty measures. This is a natural 
property of an inequality measure (Atkinson 1970). 
The fact that measures such as the poverty gap either increase or are unchanged 
when the incomes of the non-poor rise seems natural if the problem is seen as 
one of measuring inequality with a particular focus on the poor. The behavior 
expected of a measure of the difficulty of ending poverty is quite different. 
Obviously, an improvement in the incomes of poor people should reduce the 
measure, as with standard poverty measures. On the other hand, an increase in 
the income of the non-poor should also reduce the measure, though not by as 
much. This is because an increase in the income of the non-poor provides 
additional resources some of which may be applied to the task of reducing 
poverty.  4 
3. The poverty burden 
In this section, we introduce and characterize a measure of the difficulty of 
ending poverty. We consider a population of N  individuals, with incomes 
(y1 … yN), and a predetermined poverty line z. We assume that the set of 
individuals with income yn> z is non-empty. We consider the class of indexes 
P(y1 … yN, z), depending only on the income vector (y1 … yN) and the poverty line 
z. 
The Poverty Burden, denoted PB is given by 
PB (y1 … yN, z) = (Σn∈N max(z-yn,0)) /Σn∈N max (yn-z,0) 
The numerator is the poverty gap. The denominator is total income in excess of 
the poverty line and represents the resources potentially available to reduce 
poverty. 
The Poverty Burden has the following properties: 
P.1 Decomposability Given subpopulations Ni = N1 … NI, the index for the 
aggregate population is equal to 
P = Σi siPi 
where  
si =  (Σn∈Ni max (yn-z,0))/(Σn∈N max (yn-z,0)) 
is the share of subpopulation Ni in total income in excess of the poverty line and 
Pi is the index for group Ni. 
P.2 Zero in the absence of poverty If yn ≥ z ∀ n, P = 0. 
P.3 Normalized to unity for a poor society  If Σn∈N yn/N  = z , P =1. 
Decomposability is an appealing property for a measure designed for policy 
implementation. In particular, it ensures that given two populations for which 
the index is equal to some Poverty Burden, the index for the combined 
population is also P. More generally, the index for an aggregate population is a 
weighted average of the indexes for the subpopulations. 5 
Indexes with the property of decomposability, such as those used by Anand and 
Kakwani have been criticized because they are insensitive to transfers among 
the poor (and also to transfers among the non-poor). In the present context, this 
property is an advantage. The Poverty Burden measure is designed with a focus 
on transfers from the non-poor to the poor, and not on the distribution of income 
within these groups. 
The Zero property is a natural requirement for any measure of poverty. If there 
are no poor people, then the measure of poverty should be equal to zero.  
Finally, P.3 is a natural normalization for a measure of the magnitude of the 
poverty problem. If the income of a country is so low that, even distributed 
equally, it cannot lift everyone above the poverty line, it seems reasonable to 
regard the country as a whole as being poor. Note that the definition of the index 
does not preclude values above 1, for cases when the average income is below the 
poverty line. 
We now derive our main result: 
Proposition 1: The Poverty Burden PB is the unique index satisfying P.1 to P.3  
Proof: We first show that an index P satisfying P.1–P.3 is independent of 
the distribution of income among the non-poor. Consider any two1
P(yj-δ, yk + δ,z) = 0. 
 non-poor 
individuals j, k. By P.2, P(yj, yk, z) = 0. Now consider a transfer δ from j to k 
that leaves both individuals non-poor, so that  
Let Y-jk denote the set {y1 … yN} with yj  and yk removed. Set 
s = ((yj-z)+(yk-z))/(Σn∈N max (yn-z, 0)) 
Then, by P.2, 
P(y1 … yˆ, z)   = s P(yj-δ, yk + δ, z)+(1-s) P(y-nm,z) 
                                            
1  The proof requires that the number of non-poor individuals should be greater than 2. The cases 
when there are one or two non-poor individuals are trivial. 6 
  = (1-s) P(y-nm,z)  
  = sP(yj-δ, yk-δ,z)+(1-s) P(y-nm,z) 
  = P(y1 ...yj-δ ... yk + δ... yN, z) 
where the second equality holds because P(yj-δ, yk + δ, z) = 0 since both are 
non-poor after the transfer.  By a similar argument it may be shown that 
the index is independent of the number of non-poor people. 
We now prove the main result for a population such that average income 
exceeds the poverty line. Let the number of poor people be M. From the 
preliminary arguments, we may assume, without loss of generality, that, 
for each poor person with income z-δ there exists a non-poor person with 
income z+δ.  
Divide the population into M+1 subpopulations, with 1...M consisting of one 
poor and one non-poor person selected to have total income 2z as above, and 
M+1 consisting of all the remaining non-poor persons. Then: 
 P(ym, z) = 1, m=1...M,   
P(yM+1, z) = 0 
 and hence 
P(y1 … yN, z)  = Σn∈N sm,  
=  (Σn∈Ni max (yn-z, 0))/(Σn∈N max (yn-z, 0)) 
which is the poverty index PB. ■ 
A closely related alternative to the poverty burden measure is based on the tax 
rate required to be applied to all income rather than income in excess of the 
poverty line. That is, we seek to determine 
PB*= t/(1+t) 7 
where t is the rate of tax on all incomes required to fund sufficient transfers to 
raise all post-tax and transfer income to the poverty line. 
To derive this obtain P.1* by replacing si in P.1 with  
s*i =  (Σn∈Ni y)/(Σn∈N yn)) 
We obtain  
Corollary 1.1: The unique index satisfying P.1*,P.2, P.3 is 
PB*= 2PB/(1+PB) 
 
An increase in income, whether it accrues to the poor or the non-poor, reduces 
the poverty burden PB. Hence, defining  
WB(y1 … yN, z) =1 - PB(y1 … yN, z)  
we obtain a social welfare function. the properties of which may be characterized 
as follows: 
Proposition 2: The index WB is a social welfare function which is 
(i) Strictly increasing in y 
(ii) Strictly decreasing in z 
(iii) Homothetic of degree zero in its arguments 
(iv) Strictly egalitarian 
All of these properties apply, with a change of sign, to PB. 
Proof:  (i)–(iii) are trivial. For (iv) we observe that if m is poor 
∂W/∂ym =  (Σn∈N max(z-yn, 0))+(Σn∈N max (yn-z, 0))2/(Σn∈N max (yn-z, 0))2  
  = (1+PB)/(Σn∈N max (yn-z, 0)), 
while if m is non-poor 
∂W/∂ym = (Σn∈N max(z-yn,0))/(Σn∈N max (yn-z,0))2  
  =PB/(Σn∈N max (yn-z,0)). 8 
Thus the welfare function may be locally approximated by a concave angle 
function. As observed by Machina (1982), this is sufficient to ensure that the 
function is globally concave and hence egalitarian.■ 
 
Briefly commenting on the properties derived above, monotonicity, derived as 
2(i), is a standard feature for a social welfare function. In the context of poverty 
discussions, it seems appropriate that the higher the poverty line the lower the 
social welfare associated with any given distribution.  Homotheticity 2(iii) is a 
desirable property for index numbers in general. In the present context, it 
ensures that changes in the unit of measure do not affect the value of the index. 
Further, if the concept of poverty is defined in strictly relative terms (for 
example as some proportion of mean or median income) a proportional increase 
in all incomes leaves the index unchanged. Finally, 2(iv) (egalitarianism) is a 
natural requirement. 
4.Effectiveness and fungibility 
It is inevitable, even if policies are designed to focus on the objective of 
alleviating poverty, that not all aid will flow to poor people. Administrative costs 
and incomplete targeting are inevitable, as are, to some degree, rent-seeking and 
corruption. More importantly, as noted above, many governments adopt aid 
policies that are not focused on alleviating poverty. 
Secondly, aid may have counterproductive effects. These include incentive effects 
familiar from debates in developed countries over the redistributive effects of 
tax–welfare systems. In addition, aid delivered in kind, such as food aid, may 
reduce the incomes of domestic producers who may, in some cases, be poorer 
than the aid recipients.  However, there is no reason to believe that such 
second-round effects will be such as to more than offset the benefits of aid. 
In the literature on the relationship between aid and poverty, summarized by  
Rajan and Subramanian (2008), discussion of the effectiveness of aid has focused 9 
almost exclusively on the effects of aid on subsequent economic growth. This 
focus is implicit in the term ‘development aid’.  This focus contrasts sharply 
with the discussion of domestic welfare policies, where the primary focus is on 
raising the consumption levels of households with low (or no) market income.  
A focus on aid as a driver of economic growth is problematic in a number of 
respects. First, as Rajan and Subramanian (2008, p659) observe: 
even in theory—unless one postulates significant 
nonlinearities in the relationship between investment and 
growth—it is unlikely that resources for investment by 
themselves, no matter how well used, will lead to 
substantial increases in growth2
The reason is straightforward. Even assuming that all aid were allocated to 
investment, the prediction coefficient of aid (expressed as percentage points of 
GDP) in a growth regression is unlikely to be more than 0.16 and is more 
plausibly estimated at around 0.03, the typical coefficient on the investment to 
GDP ratio in cross-section growth regressions derived by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 12). These coefficients are within the standard error 
of most of the regressions reported by Rajan and Subramanian. Hence, the 
statistical tests available to us do not permit us to distinguish between the null 
hypothesis  that aid has no effect on growth and the theoretical prediction 
derived from the assumption that all aid is invested. 
. 
Aid effectiveness and the persistence of poverty 
Going further, it is commonly argued that the fact that poverty has persisted in 
many countries, despite large infusions of aid, shows that aid must be ineffectual 
(Easterly 2007). 
                                            
2 Rajan and Subramanian add the qualification ‘ unless accompanied by policies that increase 
total factor productivity’. But this qualification is applicable only on the hypothesis the adoption 
of these policies is induced by the receipt of foreign aid. 10 
Consideration of the poverty burden shows that such arguments cannot be 
sustained. As previously noted, development aid provided by wealthy countries 
has never approached the agreed target of 0.7 per cent of income and has 
generally been around 0.3 per cent of world income. By contrast, until the 1990s, 
the poverty burden exceeded 3 per cent of world income. 
Hence, even on the maximally optimistic assumption that all aid flowed to the 
world’s poorest people, with no adverse second-round effects, the aid that has 
been provided since the mid-20th century would not have been sufficient to 
generate a substantial reduction in poverty. 
This argument is applicable whether aid is allocated to increasing the 
consumption of the poor or (less plausibly) to investment projects whose benefits 
accrue exclusively to the poor. Investment projects as generating a  flow of 
consumption benefits. As the discussion of Rajan and Subramanian implies, for 
any plausible estimate of rates of return, the volume of aid actually provided to 
poor countries has been insufficient to generate returns that would produce a 
substantial reduction in poverty. 
But the criterion for the effectiveness of aid implicit in the argument under 
discussion is even more ambitious than this. The implicit assumption is that if 
people, having received and consumed aid in the past, remain poor, then the aid 
has been ineffective. In the context of domestic anti-poverty policy, the analogous 
test would be that social assistance should not merely have no adverse incentive 
effects but should induce increases in the market income of the poor so great as 
to eliminate poverty. On such a criterion, all forms of income assistance, and 
most other forms of social assistance would certainly fail. 
Thus, consideration of poverty burden measures shows that widely used 
arguments for the ineffectiveness of aid fail basic tests of arithmetic consistency.  11 
Fungibility and the proportion of aid received by the poor 
The poverty burden is a lower bound for the cost, relative to aggregate income, of 
a set of transfers sufficient to raise all households to the poverty line. Although 
such a lower bound is of conceptual interest, a more relevant issue for policy is 
the cost of a feasible  program of transfers. The crucial question here is what 
proportion of aid is received by the poor. This question in turn depends on the 
extent to which aid directed to the poor may be treated as fungible income by the 
government concerned, and to what extent the poor benefit from increases in 
such fungible income. 
To the extent that aid is only partially effective in raising the incomes of poor 
people  the transfer required to achieve any given poverty elimination goal will 
be increased. That is, if the proportion of aid that is received by the poor is 
denoted by θ,  where 0 < θ < 1, the level of aid required to eliminate poverty is 
PB/θ. 
This way of framing the issue suggests a number of possible approaches to 
estimating θ. The ideal case θ = 1 gives a lower bound to the cost of eliminating 
poverty, but is of limited practical relevance.  
Alternatively we might assume that aid is used to provide public goods, with an 
equal benefit to all members of the population. In this case θ is equal to the 
headcount measure of poverty, that is, the proportion of the entire population 
that is poor.  
Discussion of the proportion of aid reaching the poor has been couched mainly in 
terms of  ‘fungibility’. The fungibility literature implies that aid might be 
allocated in proportion to existing public expenditure. The central idea is that 
aid directed to the poor by donor countries3
                                            
3 In practice, much aid is not directed at improving the living standards of the poor, but at 
meeting other objectives of the donor country, such as provision of support to friendly 
governments. However, in considering the possible use of the poverty burden measure by aid 
agencies in donor countries, it seems appropriate to focus on the question of how much aid, 
 may be used to replace existing 12 
government expenditure, with the resulting additional revenue being used either 
to fund expenditure in other areas (Burnside and Dollar 2000) 
The allocation of expenditure is generally pro-poor in the sense that poor people 
receive more, on average, in welfare payments and government services than do 
those with higher incomes. Thus, on this assumption, the value of  θ would be 
bounded below by the headcount. 
A less favorable assumption, adopted by Collier and Dollar (2002) is that the 
benefits of aid take the form of a proportional increase in income for all members 
of the community. This would be the case on the joint assumptions that  
(i) aid is fully fungible  
(ii) additional government income is used entirely to reduce taxation, and  
(iii) that the total tax burden is proportional to income  
In this case, θ is equal to the proportion of income received by the poor, and the 
poverty-reducing effects of aid arise only from the fact that income is transferred 
from rich to poor governments, in a form of fiscal equalization.  
Considering the realism of the assumptions required to derive Collier and 
Dollar’s conclusion, (iii) is approximately correct for most taxation systems, but 
(i) and (ii) seem overly pessimistic. 
 
6. The    magnitude of the poverty burden 
In this section, we present estimates of the Poverty Burden for the world and 
various regions,  using $1/day and $2/day poverty lines. Data in 2005 values for 
the poverty gap ratios were obtained from the World Bank using the PovcalNet 
                                                                                                                                         
directed at reducing poverty, would be required to raise all poor people to the poverty threshold. 13 
calculations
4
Table 1:  Poverty Burden (per cent) Using $1/day Poverty Line     
 and GDP per capita data were obtained from World Development 
Indicators.   
 
  1981  1984  1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005 
East Asia & Pacific  51.2  29.1  19.0  15.7  11.0  5.5  5.0  3.1  1.3 
Europe & Central Asia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.1 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.5 
Middle East & North Africa  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2 
South Asia  26.0  21.4  18.6  15.2  12.2  10.5  8.8  8.0  5.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  15.6  18.0  18.3  19.9  20.7  20.5  20.2  17.9  14.6 
World  4.3  3.3  2.7  2.5  2.3  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.1 
India  26.1  21.2  18.1  14.5  12.8  10.0  8.4  7.5  5.7 
China  86.4  42.1  23.1  22.5  14.0  6.4  5.4  3.3  1.2 
Bangladesh  22.3  22.3  22.3  23.4  23.2  21.3  22.9  19.5  15.9 
World excluding India & China  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.0  0.8 
Source: World Bank, authors’ calculations 
Table 2:  Poverty Burden (per cent) Using $2/day Poverty Line     
 
  1981  1984  1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005 
East Asia & Pacific  114.1  65.1  47.9  40.1  29.4  18.2  15.8  10.7  6.0 
Europe & Central Asia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.5  0.9  1.2  1.3  1.0  0.6 
Latin America & Caribbean  2.1  2.5  2.2  1.9  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.3 
Middle East & North Africa  3.2  2.5  2.7  2.3  2.2  2.1  1.9  1.7  1.5 
South Asia  67.0  59.3  53.7  46.0  40.8  35.7  30.9  28.6  22.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  31.8  35.4  35.7  37.2  39.7  39.6  39.2  36.4  31.2 
                                            
4 See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet   14 
World  10.1  8.0  7.0  6.5  6.3  5.5  5.1  4.4  3.5 
India  67.4  59.5  53.8  45.3  42.0  34.6  29.9  27.2  21.4 
China  195.7  93.8  60.3  54.8  36.4  21.0  16.3  10.7  5.4 
Bangladesh  84.3  82.4  79.5  78.5  74.2  66.6  64.8  57.6  49.9 
World w/o India and China  3.6  3.6  3.4  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.9  2.6  2.2 




Tables 1 and 2 have a number of striking features. For the world as a whole, the 
Poverty Burden using the $1/day poverty line declined between 1981 and 2005, 
from 4.3 per cent to 1.1 per cent. The decline using the $2/day poverty line was 
even larger in absolute terms, from 10.1 per cent to 3.5 per cent. 
The calculations reported in Table 1 show that, if all countries contributed 
taxation revenue equal to a little over 1 per cent of national income to global 
poverty alleviation, and if this revenue flowed to the world’s poorest people with 
no leakages or adverse second-round effects, extreme poverty could be 
eliminated. An allocation of 3.5 per cent of income, comparable to the Marshall 
Plan at its peak would be equal to the entire amount required to raise minimum 
incomes to $2/day. 
The decline in the Poverty Burden is primarily the result of favorable 
developments in East and South Asia. Between 1981 and 2005, the poverty gap 
in East Asia and the Pacific declined from 51.2 per cent to 1.3 per cent for the 
$1/day poverty line and 114.1 per cent 6.0 per cent for the $2/day line. The 
results for the $2/day poverty line are particularly striking In 1981 the region as 
a whole had an average income below the $2/day poverty line. By contrast, by 
2005, the poverty burden was small enough that it could be addressed using the 15 
region’s own resources on the basis of expenditures smaller, in relation to 
national income than those typical of welfare systems in developed countries.  
The decline in South Asia is less dramatic, but still notable, for both measures. 
By contrast, the poverty burden in Sub-Saharan Africa has barely changed. This 
lack of progress is the result of stagnation in income per person, combined with 
very little change in overall income distribution.  
Finally, the results for the world without India and China are of some interest. 
Given the rapid economic growth experienced in these two countries, at least 
until the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that extreme poverty in these countries could be addressed primarily 
through domestic policies of redistribution, regional development assistance and 
so on.  
On the $1/day measure, the Poverty Burden for the world without India and 
China was only 0.8 per cent in 2005, very close to the long-standing target for 
development aid of 0.7 per cent of national income/GDP, reaffirmed in Monterrey 
at the 2002 United Nations International Conference on Financing Development.    
Although there is a significant gap between the commitment of 0.7 per cent and 
the poverty burden of 1.1 per cent, much of this gap reflects the persistence of 
extreme poverty in some rural areas of India and China. If poverty in these 
rapidly-growing countries were addressed from domestic resources (including 
continued growth, internal remittances and domestic redistribution), and the 
developed world adhered to its commitments, the resulting revenue would be 
sufficient to meet the goal of poverty elimination for the remaining countries 
where poverty is high (mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia). That is, if 
China and India resolved their own poverty problems, and aid were targeted 
entirely at poverty reduction, the amount promised at Monterrey would be 
sufficient to eliminate extreme poverty.  
This point can be made more precise, using the Poverty Burden measure. The 
Poverty Burden for the world, excluding China and India, was 0.78 per cent in 16 
2005, only marginally in excess of the 0.7 per cent target. Assuming a 
continuation of the declining trend observed in Table 1, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that, if developed countries met their obligations, and aid were 
effectively targeted at the poor, extreme poverty could be eliminated within a few 
years. 
Unfortunately, few developed countries have met their commitments, and many 
have directed aid primarily to governments seen as important for geopolitical 
reasons, rather than to poor people. 
Few nations are close to the agreed 0.7 per cent target for development aid. 
Among developed countries, only Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands 
and Sweden exceeded the target. Belgium and Austria were the only other countries to 
provide even 0.5 percent of GNP. The average overseas development aid to donor 
GNI was 0.25 per cent in 2003 (United Nations Millennium Project 2005).5
Concluding comments 
   
Measures of poverty and inequality are useful diagnostic tools in assessing the 
equity, or otherwise, of income distribution. In this paper, it has been argued 
that a different class of measures, referred to as poverty burden measures, is 
needed to assess the magnitude  of the task of eliminating extreme poverty. 
Taking considerations of effectiveness and targeting into account, it seems likely 
that the volume of additional income required to end extreme poverty would be 
significantly in excess of the value of 1.1 per cent of world income estimated in 
Table 1. Nevertheless, if the developed world could agree on transfers 
comparable to those made by the United States during the Marshall Plan era 
(around 2 per cent of GDP annually), and if global economic growth recovers 
quickly from the financial crisis, a rapid reduction in extreme poverty should be 
achievable. 
                                            
5 The ratio of overseas development aid to GDP for the developed countries was 0.51 per cent in 1960, 0.33 per 
cent in 1970, 0.35  per cent in 1980, 0.34  per cent in 1990 and 0.23  per cent in 2002 (UN 2005). 17 
Aid must be allocated between consumption (aid that provides direct 
improvements in current living standards) and investment (aid that is aimed at 
increasing living standards in the future). Much policy discussion implies that 
investment is always to be preferred to consumption. But economic analysis 
gives no basis for such a preference. Increasing the current consumption of the 
poor is good in itself, whether or not it contributes to increases in future income 
and consumption. 
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